The lights will not go out…
they are simply waiting to be brought to light.
By Louis Perez y Cid
The Cycles of Power
History does not progress in a straight line; it moves. It glides from one center of gravity to another.
The European upheaval of the 15th and 16th centuries was not primarily military, but intellectual. The rediscovery of ancient texts, the circulation of Byzantine manuscripts, the printing press, humanist thought, the work of Nicolaus Copernicus and Galileo—all these created fissures in a world ordered around the Holy Roman Empire and religious authority. This moment has a name: the Renaissance.
Innovation arises when knowledge circulates; power follows.
The 15th-century Portuguese opened maritime routes.
The 16th-century Spanish organized the empire.
The 17th-century Dutch invented modern finance.
The 18th-century French structured political thought.
The 19th-century British industrialized the planet.
But history is not simply an alternation of dominations. It is a succession of anthropological models. Each, in turn, imposes its way of organizing humanity, power, and the world.
These powers were unequal, sometimes brutal, always rivals. Their confrontation culminated in the two world wars, a European suicide that ushered in the 20th century, dominated by others: the United States and the Soviet Union.
The 20th century was bipolar, and the 21st century seems hesitant. The question is not only who dominates today. It is to understand what makes power endure.
The European upheaval of the 15th and 16th centuries was not primarily military, but intellectual. The rediscovery of ancient texts, the circulation of Byzantine manuscripts, the printing press, humanist thought, the work of Nicolaus Copernicus and Galileo—all these created fissures in a world ordered around the Holy Roman Empire and religious authority. This moment has a name: the Renaissance.
Innovation arises when knowledge circulates; power follows.
The 15th-century Portuguese opened maritime routes.
The 16th-century Spanish organized the empire.
The 17th-century Dutch invented modern finance.
The 18th-century French structured political thought.
The 19th-century British industrialized the planet.
But history is not simply an alternation of dominations. It is a succession of anthropological models. Each, in turn, imposes its way of organizing humanity, power, and the world.
These powers were unequal, sometimes brutal, always rivals. Their confrontation culminated in the two world wars, a European suicide that ushered in the 20th century, dominated by others: the United States and the Soviet Union.
The 20th century was bipolar, and the 21st century seems hesitant. The question is not only who dominates today. It is to understand what makes power endure.
A historical constant: attractiveness.
In The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Montesquieu formulated a crucial insight: political liberty rests on balance. Unlimited power breeds fear; moderate power creates confidence.
Sustainable power is not only military; it is attractive. Moderation is a principle of longevity.
In the 16th century, Spain reigned over a vast empire, fueled by the gold of the New World. Yet, entrepreneurial dynamism shifted toward the Dutch Republic. Why?
Because contracts were protected there, commercial law was reliable, and risk was better shared. The founding of the Dutch East India Company in 1602 marked an institutional revolution; legal trust became a driving force of power.
The same logic applied in France. In 1598, the Edict of Nantes, promulgated by Henry IV, granted freedom of conscience and freedom of worship to Protestants, stabilizing a fractured kingdom. Its revocation in 1685 by Louis XIV led to the exile of tens of thousands of artisans and intellectuals. The loss was as much economic as symbolic.
History is harsh; intolerance does not always lead to immediate impoverishment, but it erodes.
Sustainable power is not only military; it is attractive. Moderation is a principle of longevity.
In the 16th century, Spain reigned over a vast empire, fueled by the gold of the New World. Yet, entrepreneurial dynamism shifted toward the Dutch Republic. Why?
Because contracts were protected there, commercial law was reliable, and risk was better shared. The founding of the Dutch East India Company in 1602 marked an institutional revolution; legal trust became a driving force of power.
The same logic applied in France. In 1598, the Edict of Nantes, promulgated by Henry IV, granted freedom of conscience and freedom of worship to Protestants, stabilizing a fractured kingdom. Its revocation in 1685 by Louis XIV led to the exile of tens of thousands of artisans and intellectuals. The loss was as much economic as symbolic.
History is harsh; intolerance does not always lead to immediate impoverishment, but it erodes.
Democracy and its Internal Risk
In Democracy in America (1845), Alexis de Tocqueville shows that democracy carries within it a permanent tension. It liberates the individual, but can also isolate them. The danger is not necessarily brutal tyranny, but rather indifference, complacency, and civic apathy.
The vitality of a free regime depends less on its laws than on the moral energy of its citizens.
Hannah Arendt, in On Violence (1970) and in The Human Condition, distinguishes between power and violence. Lasting power rests on consent and collective action. Violence, on the other hand, can be effective, but when it becomes permanent, it reveals a deficit of legitimacy.
Authoritarian regimes can accumulate strength and achieve results. The question is not to deny the strategic capacity of contemporary China or the decisive power of the United States. The question is deeper: what model inspires creative and lasting support?
Institutional moderation is not a strategic weakness; it is a condition for sustainability.
The vitality of a free regime depends less on its laws than on the moral energy of its citizens.
Hannah Arendt, in On Violence (1970) and in The Human Condition, distinguishes between power and violence. Lasting power rests on consent and collective action. Violence, on the other hand, can be effective, but when it becomes permanent, it reveals a deficit of legitimacy.
Authoritarian regimes can accumulate strength and achieve results. The question is not to deny the strategic capacity of contemporary China or the decisive power of the United States. The question is deeper: what model inspires creative and lasting support?
Institutional moderation is not a strategic weakness; it is a condition for sustainability.
20th Century: Two Competing Models
After 1945, two systems clashed.
The United States became a pole of attraction for science, art, and entrepreneurship. Universities, research, skilled immigration—openness fueled growth and power.
The Soviet Union offered a different promise: proclaimed equality, planning, and political control. Its initial performance was impressive. But the lack of economic and political freedom limited its adaptability. Its collapse in 1991 revealed a rigid structure.
Today, China combines economic openness with strict political control. Its rise to power is spectacular. It demonstrates that an authoritarian regime can generate growth and technology. One question remains: does centralization foster long-term innovation, or does it ultimately constrain it?
The United States remains a major power. But its internal cohesion is evolving in a context of increased polarization. But attractiveness depends as much on institutional stability as on material power.
The United States became a pole of attraction for science, art, and entrepreneurship. Universities, research, skilled immigration—openness fueled growth and power.
The Soviet Union offered a different promise: proclaimed equality, planning, and political control. Its initial performance was impressive. But the lack of economic and political freedom limited its adaptability. Its collapse in 1991 revealed a rigid structure.
Today, China combines economic openness with strict political control. Its rise to power is spectacular. It demonstrates that an authoritarian regime can generate growth and technology. One question remains: does centralization foster long-term innovation, or does it ultimately constrain it?
The United States remains a major power. But its internal cohesion is evolving in a context of increased polarization. But attractiveness depends as much on institutional stability as on material power.
Europe: End of an Era or a New Beginning?
The European Union is not an empire; it is a unique legal construct.
It possesses one of the world's leading markets, a high-level scientific capacity, a consolidated rule of law, and a culture of institutional compromise. Its fragility stems less from its resources than from its strategic fragmentation.
Yet, if the second half of the 21st century were to see the emergence of a new center of gravity, it could be European, not through domination, but through coalition. A sovereign Europe, associated with other technologically advanced democracies, could form a pole of stability and innovation.
It possesses one of the world's leading markets, a high-level scientific capacity, a consolidated rule of law, and a culture of institutional compromise. Its fragility stems less from its resources than from its strategic fragmentation.
Yet, if the second half of the 21st century were to see the emergence of a new center of gravity, it could be European, not through domination, but through coalition. A sovereign Europe, associated with other technologically advanced democracies, could form a pole of stability and innovation.
The Overarching Lesson
Throughout the centuries, from the lessons of Montesquieu (1748), Tocqueville (1845), and Arendt, one principle remains.
Societies that guarantee legal certainty, the free flow of ideas, and relative fairness attract dynamic forces. Those that become closed off ultimately depend more on coercion than on commitment. Modern power is no longer merely territorial; it is cognitive, scientific, and normative.
The lights do not go out; they shift to spaces where the mind can work freely.
Societies that guarantee legal certainty, the free flow of ideas, and relative fairness attract dynamic forces. Those that become closed off ultimately depend more on coercion than on commitment. Modern power is no longer merely territorial; it is cognitive, scientific, and normative.
The lights do not go out; they shift to spaces where the mind can work freely.