China is emerging from its century of humiliation.
And Europe?
By Louis Perez y Cid
There are nations that view their history as a memory. And then there are those that make it a policy. China clearly belongs to the second category.
To understand the Chinese power unfolding today, it is not enough to look at its factories, its technology companies, or its aircraft carriers. One must look back to the 19th century and understand this expression that remains at the heart of the Chinese national narrative: the "century of humiliation," bǎinián guóchǐ — 百年国耻.
From approximately 1839 to 1949, China experienced a succession of defeats, foreign interventions, territorial concessions, and infringements on its sovereignty. The Opium Wars, unequal treaties, foreign concessions, defeat at the hands of Japan, the Japanese invasion, and then the civil wars tell the story of a country that, for a century, ceased to be master of its own destiny.
The trauma began with the Opium Wars.
In the 19th century, Great Britain massively developed the trade in opium produced in India in order to rebalance its trade with China. Beijing attempted to ban this trade. In 1839, the imperial commissioner Lin Zexu ordered the seizure and destruction of large quantities of opium in Canton.
London responded with force. China was defeated.
The Treaty of Nanking, in 1842, notably imposed the cession of Hong Kong to Great Britain, the opening of several ports, and the payment of substantial reparations.
Then came the Second Opium War. In 1860, French and British troops entered Beijing and burned down the Yuanmingyuan, the imperial summer palace.
The image remains: foreign armies entering the capital of the Chinese Empire and destroying the symbols of its power.
Foreign concessions then multiplied, extraterritoriality took hold, Russia and Japan seized territories, and China was once again defeated.
In the 20th century, the Japanese invasion added considerable violence to the trauma.
This is therefore not just the story of opium.
It is the story of a sovereignty gradually eroded.
"Never again."
From this history, contemporary China has drawn a conclusion: never again.
Never again should a foreign power be able to impose its will upon it. Never again should China be weak enough to become dependent or vulnerable. This history sheds light on aspects of current Chinese policy: Hong Kong, Taiwan, the disputed territories, the distrust of foreign interference, the mastery of strategic technologies, and military modernization.
China is therefore not simply seeking to become richer.
It is seeking to become unconstrainable.
Its economic power must guarantee its independence.
Its technological mastery, reduce its vulnerabilities.
Its military power, prevent a return to the past.
Prosperity is no longer an end in itself. It has become an instrument of sovereignty.
And what about Europe?
This is where Chinese history becomes interesting for us.
Comparisons with the Chinese “century of humiliation” must, of course, be approached with caution. Europe has not experienced the same history as China. It has not suffered the same unequal treaties or the same forms of domination.
But there is a historical turning point that can hardly be denied: 1945. Europe emerged from two world wars that had ravaged its territory and destroyed much of its economic and military power. The former European powers became dependent on two superpowers outside the continent: the United States and the Soviet Union.
Empires disappeared. The center of gravity of the world shifted. Europe then rightly chose peace. It built the Common Market, reconciled France and Germany, and gradually created an exceptional economic and political space.
But it left one question unanswered: that of power.
A rich but dependent Europe
Europe is today one of the richest regions on the planet. It has a vast market, leading companies, and considerable human capital.
But can it decide its own destiny?
For its security, it remains largely dependent on the United States. In certain critical technologies, it depends on external powers. It has discovered its energy and industrial vulnerability. In the digital realm, it makes massive use of infrastructure and platforms it does not control.
For decades, we believed that economic interdependence would be enough to guarantee our security. We sometimes confused peace with a lack of power.
China, however, made the opposite choice.
Sovereignty is a capability.
China has understood something that Europe may have forgotten: sovereignty is not a declaration. It is a capability.
To be sovereign is to be able to defend oneself, produce, innovate, control one's essential technologies, secure one's supplies, and possess diplomatic power commensurate with one's interests. This does not mean autarky.
It simply means not being forced to do what others have decided for you.
This is probably the main lesson Europe can learn from China.
Not its political system. Not its authoritarianism. Not its nationalism.
But its ability to transform its economic power into strategic power.
Must Europe unite to regain its sovereignty?
No European nation, taken individually, currently has the means to compete with the United States or China in all strategic areas.
France possesses nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the Security Council. Germany has considerable industrial power. The Netherlands possesses essential semiconductor technologies. Other countries excel in aeronautics, space, energy, or defense.
The problem, therefore, is not a lack of power.
It is its fragmentation.
Perhaps Europe should not strive to become a superpower. It should become a power capable of making decisions.
A credible military, industrial, energy, and technological power. A power capable of protecting its interests and its borders.
In short, a sovereign power.
Does Europe need its own "1949"?
China has a founding date in its contemporary narrative: 1949. The People's Republic was proclaimed. The country emerged from decades of wars, invasions, and divisions. In the Chinese political narrative, this date marks the end of humiliation and the beginning of national rejuvenation.
Europe did not have its 1949.
It had its 1945.
But it has not yet transformed the trauma of its decline into a genuine project of power. Perhaps this is where our difficulty lies.
China looked at its past and said, "We will never be weak again."
Europe looked at its own and said, "We will never wage war again."
Both ambitions are legitimate.
But peace without power can become dependence.
And power without peace can become a threat.
The true European project should be to reconcile the two:
peace through power, power in the service of freedom, sovereignty in the service of peace.
Not to become China, but to learn from it.
This is obviously not about asking Europe to become Chinese. It must remain true to its democracies, its freedoms, and its own political model.
But it can look at China and understand something essential.
Beijing has turned its past humiliation into a doctrine of power.
Europe shouldn't wait for another humiliation to understand that it needs one.
The world to come will likely no longer be one of a dominant West facing the rest of the world. It will be multipolar. The United States will remain a major power, China will continue its rise, India will assert itself, and other regional powers will take their place.
In this world, the question will no longer be simply whether Europe wants to exert influence. It will be whether it has the means to do so.
China has devoted the last few decades to transforming its economic power into political, technological, and military power.
Europe has devoted its own to building a vast area of prosperity.
Perhaps it's time to do both. Because history never guarantees a civilization the place it occupied yesterday.
China learned this the hard way. Europe might have the chance to understand this without experiencing the same ordeal.
Will the next humiliation be the one we inflict upon ourselves?
For a century, China has lived with the memory of humiliation. It has turned it into a driving force of power.
Europe, for its part, could face a similar choice: continue to delegate its security, its critical technologies, and a portion of its industrial power, or finally accept that sovereignty comes at a price: the price of power.
The 21st century may not be the century of the West versus China.
It could be the century of the awakening of great powers.
China no longer asks permission to exist as a great power. It acts.
It is now up to Europe to choose whether it simply wants to prosper in the world that others are building...
or finally participate in building it.