Marshal Pétain
By Louis Perez y Cid
The controversy surrounding the mass for Marshal Pétain on November 14, 2025, has reignited a typically French polarization: the mayor of Verdun, from the left, opposes it; a right-wing association takes legal action. What should be a calm debate about history immediately becomes an ideological clash. In France, questions of memory too often serve as political battlegrounds.
Like many former legionnaires of foreign origin, I observe this country with respect but also with perplexity. A naturalized Frenchman, like myself, does not inherit the political landmarks passed down within families, landmarks that have shaped the left-right divide for over a century. France is a centralized state, where political life occupies a disproportionate place; even those who are disinterested in it end up taking sides.
My Understanding of French Political Parties and Culture
When I talk with activists, I get the sense that political parties function less as democratic organizations and more as identity-based blocs.
Some refer to this as the "people of the left." Their primary objective is not to develop collective solutions, but to seize power, often driven by a desire to counter the opposing side rather than to serve the common good. This confrontational approach muddles public debate and prevents the emergence of a national consensus on major issues.
Successive reforms reflect this drift; they respond more to partisan imperatives than to the needs of the country. Electoral promises take precedence over coherence, and once the election is over, governance is based on successive adjustments, without a long-term vision. On both the left and the right, internal divisions run deep; unity is achieved only under electoral pressure, never through shared conviction.
In this climate, where compromise is perceived as a weakness and not as a democratic exercise, national memory becomes a political tool. Everyone selects from history what supports their narrative, even if it means simplifying or distorting it.
The political context of the interwar period
Interwar France was deeply divided. How curious!
Economic crises,
Rise of extremism,
Governmental instability (more than 40 governments in 20 years),
Chronic mistrust between the right and the left.
The parliamentary system functioned poorly; many ministers remained in office for only a few weeks. Faced with the Nazi threat, the parties were more preoccupied with their internal rivalries than with a common strategy.
The collapse of 1940
In June 1940, a few weeks after the start of the German offensive, the French army was overwhelmed. After the military defeat and internal divisions over the continuation of the war, Paul Reynaud, President of the Council, resigned.
President Albert Lebrun then called on Marshal Pétain to form a new government and effectively withdrew, without actually resigning.
Parliamentarians capitulated more quickly than the army and hastened to hand over full powers * to the 84-year-old Pétain, using him as a human shield. He suddenly became the "savior" who, only yesterday, had been considered too worn out for anything other than a November 11th ceremony. The message seemed clear to me: "You deal with the German occupation, we're out of here." Age, mocked yesterday, miraculously became a guarantee of stability and clear-sightedness. One can, and indeed must, criticize Pétain for his regime. He was, in fact, convicted ** by the courts in 1945. But the real, deeper problem perhaps lies in the ease with which political leaders, so quick to tear each other apart for power when things are going well, suddenly vanish when reality becomes too overwhelming, leaving the crisis to the village elder. A fascinating capacity for reversal.
A marvelous choreography where the ambitious evaporate at the sound of the alarm, leaving the oldest member of the family to put out the fire… or burn down with the house. Because all the “young guns” have already been shown the back door…
“With my ‘neutral’ perspective, I can’t help but see that Vichy’s responsibility doesn’t rest solely on Pétain, but also on that large majority of parliamentarians, both left and right, who granted him full powers with an almost relieved eagerness.” In 1940, it wasn't one side that failed, it was an entire political system that collapsed all at once. Vichy wasn't just the failings of an old man; it was the collective flight of a ruling class that, at the decisive moment, preferred to abdicate its responsibilities rather than stand firm.
Something to ponder for the Fifth Republic today. The more powerful the extremes, the greater the polarization, and the more likely instability becomes, with a risk of chaos.
If, unfortunately, that were to happen, do you really think our politicians, from all sides, would be any less cowardly?
* The vote was held on July 10, 1940, by the entire National Assembly (that is, members of parliament and senators meeting in Vichy). The result was decisive:
569 in favor
80 against
20 abstentions or non-voters
** The High Court sentenced him to death and national degradation, but, contrary to popular belief, it did not revoke his rank of Marshal, which he had earned in 1918 for his actions at Verdun.
His death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by de Gaulle, due to his age, his role at Verdun, and to ease the political situation in the country. He spent the rest of his life in prison on the Île d'Yeu, where he died in 1951.