A Great Power.
A Strategic Dilemma.
By Louis Perez Y Cid
The sound of marching boots echoes in the media and on social networks. The rhetoric is relentless: America is a great power that is subjugating us; Europe could become an autonomous great power; France is not just the metropolis but an archipelago across the globe and must once again become a great power, and so on. But can a "great power" avoid a strong military-industrial complex? We must know what we want, because every coin has two sides.
The Danger of Great Power
On January 17, 1961, in his farewell address at the end of his two terms, Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the "undue influence" of the military-industrial complex. He did not condemn the army; he even acknowledged the need for a strong arms industry. But he warned:
“In government councils, we must guard against the acquisition of unjustified influence, whether sought or not, by the military-industrial complex. The risk of a disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”
He was not a pacifist activist; he was a five-star general, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during the Second World War. If he spoke, it was from experience.
At the height of the Cold War, during the arms race with the USSR and the massive development of the defense industry after 1945 and the Korean War, he warned of the danger of too close an alliance between the military, industry, and political power.
Sixty-five years later, the question remains: can a great power avoid the formation of such a system?
For those from the military world, the subject deserves to be addressed without ideology or naiveté.
“In government councils, we must guard against the acquisition of unjustified influence, whether sought or not, by the military-industrial complex. The risk of a disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”
He was not a pacifist activist; he was a five-star general, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during the Second World War. If he spoke, it was from experience.
At the height of the Cold War, during the arms race with the USSR and the massive development of the defense industry after 1945 and the Korean War, he warned of the danger of too close an alliance between the military, industry, and political power.
Sixty-five years later, the question remains: can a great power avoid the formation of such a system?
For those from the military world, the subject deserves to be addressed without ideology or naiveté.
Reality or fantasy?
The military-industrial complex is neither a secret conspiracy nor a shadowy cabal.
It is an ecosystem of intertwined interests between the military establishment, political leaders, defense contractors, and scientific research.
When an army becomes permanent, technologically advanced, and integrated into the national economy, it ceases to be a temporary tool; it becomes a lasting structure.
It is an ecosystem of intertwined interests between the military establishment, political leaders, defense contractors, and scientific research.
When an army becomes permanent, technologically advanced, and integrated into the national economy, it ceases to be a temporary tool; it becomes a lasting structure.
Why does a major power tend toward this almost automatically?
A global power must protect its trade routes, maintain alliances, deter major adversaries, and invest heavily in technology.
Modern warfare relies on technological superiority, logistics, continuous innovation, and cutting-edge industry.
From the moment defense becomes a strategic industrial sector, it generates jobs, territories dependent on military contracts, powerful industrial groups, and growing political influence. This phenomenon is neither moral nor immoral. It is structural.
Modern warfare relies on technological superiority, logistics, continuous innovation, and cutting-edge industry.
From the moment defense becomes a strategic industrial sector, it generates jobs, territories dependent on military contracts, powerful industrial groups, and growing political influence. This phenomenon is neither moral nor immoral. It is structural.
The strategic dilemma.
The central paradox is that a power that drastically reduces its military-industrial complex weakens its deterrent capacity. Conversely, if it develops it massively and sustainably, this system acquires its own inertia.
This is not a question of individual corruption, but a question of institutional dynamics.
Once hundreds of thousands of jobs depend on defense, when entire regions rely on military contracts, and when scientific research is funded by defense, then budgetary decisions become politically sensitive. Defense is no longer merely strategic; it becomes economic.
This is not a question of individual corruption, but a question of institutional dynamics.
Once hundreds of thousands of jobs depend on defense, when entire regions rely on military contracts, and when scientific research is funded by defense, then budgetary decisions become politically sensitive. Defense is no longer merely strategic; it becomes economic.
Is this avoidable for a major power?
In the short term, no. In the long term, difficult, but manageable.
A major power can limit excesses if it maintains genuine parliamentary oversight, rigorous budgetary transparency, an independent press, strict rules governing the transition between industry and the civil service, and a clearly defensive military doctrine.
But it cannot completely eliminate the interdependence between industry and defense without relinquishing its status as a major power.
For former soldiers, the reflection is more profound: an army serves the nation.
But when the military also becomes an economic pillar, the risk arises that certain strategic options will become "more natural" than others, that a military response will be more readily mobilized than a diplomatic solution, and that the tool will influence strategy instead of the other way around.
A professional knows that an available tool tends to be used.
A major power can limit excesses if it maintains genuine parliamentary oversight, rigorous budgetary transparency, an independent press, strict rules governing the transition between industry and the civil service, and a clearly defensive military doctrine.
But it cannot completely eliminate the interdependence between industry and defense without relinquishing its status as a major power.
For former soldiers, the reflection is more profound: an army serves the nation.
But when the military also becomes an economic pillar, the risk arises that certain strategic options will become "more natural" than others, that a military response will be more readily mobilized than a diplomatic solution, and that the tool will influence strategy instead of the other way around.
A professional knows that an available tool tends to be used.
Vigilance as a duty.
The problem is neither the army nor industry. The risk lies in the sustained concentration of power and interests around a single sector.
Eisenhower didn't say, "Dismantle the army." He said, "Remain vigilant."
A great power can hardly avoid the formation of a military-industrial complex, but it can prevent it from becoming autonomous.
The question is not its existence, it is structural, but control. Does strategy control the tool, or does the tool guide strategy?
This question touches on the relationship between force, nation, and responsibility. Industry does not necessarily create war, but it can make its use easier; this was precisely the risk Eisenhower alluded to.
Eisenhower didn't say, "Dismantle the army." He said, "Remain vigilant."
A great power can hardly avoid the formation of a military-industrial complex, but it can prevent it from becoming autonomous.
The question is not its existence, it is structural, but control. Does strategy control the tool, or does the tool guide strategy?
This question touches on the relationship between force, nation, and responsibility. Industry does not necessarily create war, but it can make its use easier; this was precisely the risk Eisenhower alluded to.
Today's great powers.
If we speak of global power—comprehensive military capability, strategic autonomy, economic weight, and global technological and diplomatic influence—there are only two today:
China
A major industrial, military, and technological power.
A single-party, authoritarian state without competitive democratic control.
Power is concentrated, strategy is centralized, and there is strong coherence in action.
A single-party, authoritarian state without competitive democratic control.
Power is concentrated, strategy is centralized, and there is strong coherence in action.
The United States
The leading global military power, a dominant technological power, and a unique network of alliances.
A democratic state, founded on the separation of powers and institutional control.
But for American citizens, the central question is not material power. It is institutional:
Which control mechanisms remain truly effective?
Are the checks and balances strengthened or weakened?
For the strength of a great power does not rest solely on its military or its industry. It rests on the nation's ability to control its own power.
And that is where, ultimately, its longevity lies.
A democratic state, founded on the separation of powers and institutional control.
But for American citizens, the central question is not material power. It is institutional:
Which control mechanisms remain truly effective?
Are the checks and balances strengthened or weakened?
For the strength of a great power does not rest solely on its military or its industry. It rests on the nation's ability to control its own power.
And that is where, ultimately, its longevity lies.